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PREVIEW: City of Helena v. O’Connell: Double Jeopardy and
Strict Liability Offenses
Christine Hutchison*
Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, January 23,
2019, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme
Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, in Helena, Montana.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sole issue before the Court is whether the Helena
Municipal Court violated Petitioner Kristi Anne O’Connell’s
(“O’Connell”) double jeopardy protections under Montana Code
Annotated § 46–11–504(1).1
Prior prosecution of an offense in any jurisdiction bars
subsequent prosecution if the first prosecution resulted in an
acquittal or a conviction and the subsequent prosecution arose “out
of the same transaction.”2 Two charges arise out of the same
transaction if the conduct for both offenses is motivated by a
purpose to accomplish a criminal objective, and the conduct is
necessary or incidental to accomplishing that objective.3
O'Connell's appeal provides the Court with an opportunity to
reconsider whether strict liability offenses, such as driving under
the influence (“DUI”), can ever arise out of the same transaction as
other offenses.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2016, Helena police officers cited O’Connell with
careless driving for causing a multiple-vehicle accident.4
O’Connell told the responding officer she missed a turn and was
looping back when the accident occurred.5 O’Connell could not
remember how the accident happened, but she accepted

* Christine Hutchison, a 2019 juris doctor candidate at the Alexander
Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, appeared on behalf of
the City of Helena in Municipal Court while interning for the Lewis and Clark
County Attorney’s Office in 2018; however, she was not involved with the
O’Connell case in any capacity.
1
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1) (2017).
2
Id.
3
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–2–101(23).
4
Appellee’s Response Brief at 2, City of Helena v. O’Connell,
https://perma.cc/NL2X-UCRJ (Mont. Sept. 4, 2018) (No. DA 17-0440);
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1–2, City of Helena v. O’Connell,
https://perma.cc/68UT-Z6HK (Mont. June 4, 2018) (No. DA 17-0440).
5
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
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responsibility.6 She also told the officer she took several prescribed
medications and O’Connell agreed to provide a blood sample.7 The
officer cited O'Connell with careless driving, and O'Connell
pleaded guilty in Municipal Court within a week.8
The Helena City Attorney’s Office received the toxicology
report identifying four different medications in O’Connell’s blood
on August 22, 2016.9 In October of 2016, the Helena City
Attorney's Office charged O'Connell with DUI.10 O’Connell
moved to dismiss the DUI as arising under the same transaction as
the careless driving charge, and thus violating Montana’s doublejeopardy protections.11 The court denied the motion.12 O’Connell
pleaded guilty to the amended charge of negligent endangerment,
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss.13
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
O’Connell argues the City of Helena violated double-jeopardy
protections under § 46–11–504(1).14 A subsequent prosecution
violates the statute if: (1) the defendant’s conduct constitutes an
equivalent offense in both the jurisdiction where the first
prosecution occurred and the jurisdiction where the subsequent
prosecution is pursued; (2) the first prosecution resulted in an
acquittal or a conviction; and (3) the subsequent prosecution was
“based on an offense arising out of the same transaction.”15 The
parties agree the first two prongs are satisfied, and solely dispute
whether the charges arose out of the same transaction.16
“Same transaction” means “conduct consisting of a series of
acts or omissions that are motivated by . . . a purpose to
accomplish a criminal objective and that are necessary or
incidental to the accomplishment of that objective.”17 The parties
disagree on whether a person who drives while under the influence
can be motivated by a criminal objective, and, if so, whether
careless driving in this instance shares the same criminal objective.
6

Id. at 2–3.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
8
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.; MONT CONST. art. II, § 25; Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1)
7

(2017).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
Id.
14
Id. at 3.
15
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–11–504(1); see also State v. Tadewaldt, 922
P.2d 463, 465 (Mont. 1996).
16
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 10.
17
Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–202(23)(a).
12
13

74

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 79

A. Defendant-Appellant O’Connell’s Argument
Petitioner O’Connell claims both charges shared the same
criminal objective: continuing to drive after suddenly becoming
dizzy. Therefore, the DUI charge should be barred as arising from
the same transaction.18 O’Connell describes two divergent
approaches for analyzing whether charges arise from the same
transaction: the conduct approach and the elements approach.19
O’Connell asks the Court to adopt the conduct approach and
overrule two cases O’Connell alleges utilize the elements
approach.20
Under the elements approach, the Court looks to the elements
of the offenses—focusing specifically on the mental state—to
determine whether the offenses shared the same “purpose,
motivation, and criminal objective,” and thus arise from the “same
transaction.”21 The Court has twice stated that because DUI does
not have a mental state DUI cannot be motivated by a purpose to
accomplish a criminal objective.22 Since DUI has no criminal
objective, DUI cannot arise out of the same transaction as other
offenses.23 O’Connell implicitly concedes that the Municipal
Court’s denial of her motion to dismiss was correct under State v.
Condo24 and State ex rel Booth v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial
District.25 O’Connell asks the Court to overturn Condo and Booth
as inconsistent with §§ 46–11–504(1) and 46–1–202(23)(a), and
other case law utilizing the conduct approach.26
O’Connell points to State v. James27 and State v. Cech28 as
examples of the conduct approach.29 In James, the defendant drove
100 miles per hour, passed other vehicles in no-passing zones, and
eventually wrecked a vehicle while fleeing from officers.30 The
defendant was charged and convicted of fleeing a police officer in
tribal court and subsequently charged with criminal endangerment
in state court.31 The Court concluded both charges arose from the
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
Id. at 6.
20
Id. at 8.
21
Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Condo, 182 P.3d 57, 60–61 (Mont. 2008)).
22
Id. at 19–20 (citing Condo, 182 P.3d at 60–61; and State ex rel.
Booth v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial District, 972 P.2d 325, 330 (1998)).
23
Id. at 19–20.
24
182 P.3d at 57.
25
972 P.2d at 325; Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 1.
26
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 8.
27
237 P.3d 672 (Mont. 2010).
28
167 P.3d 389 (Mont. 2007).
29
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 12–14.
30
Id. at 12; James, 237 P.3d at 674.
31
James, 237 P.3d at 674.
18
19
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same conduct—driving dangerously and at a high rate of speed to
avoid capture.32 The Court noted the charges contained different
elements, but concluded the different elements did not mean the
charges arose from different transactions.33
In Cech, the defendant test drove a car and never returned it.34
Police recovered the car in Washington, and Washington charged
and convicted the defendant of possessing stolen property in the
first degree.35 Subsequently, a Montana court charged Cech with
felony theft.36 The Court held the underlying conduct for both
charges “sought to accomplish the same criminal objective–control
of the stolen vehicle.”37 The Court held the felony theft charge
violated Montana’s double jeopardy protections.
O'Connell asserts that under the conduct test she satisfies the
same transaction prong because she engaged in a single course of
conduct: choosing to continue to drive after a sudden onset of
dizziness.38 The crash was merely incidental to this decision.39
B. Plaintiff-Appellee City of Helena’s Response
The City of Helena asserts Booth, Cech, Condo, and James are
not incompatible and opposes O’Connell’s assertion that they
create different tests.40 The City of Helena maintains the Court
analyzes a person’s conduct in conjunction with the crimes
charged, and thus necessarily must sometimes look to the elements
of the crimes to determine the criminal objective motivating the
underlying conduct.41
In Cech, the Court focused on the elements of the two charges,
finding “Cech’s asserted motivations, that of ‘knowingly . . .
withhold[ing] or appropriate[ing]’ the Honda ‘to the use of any
person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto,’
R.C.W. § 9A.56.140, or of ‘depriving the owner of the property’
under § 45–6–301(1)(a)” were the same.42
The City notes the Court in James looked to the elements of the
crimes in acknowledging the fleeing charge was based on
“knowingly fleeing from an Officer . . . by traveling at a high rate
of speed and/or making improper passes,” and the criminal
32

Id. at 675.
Id.
34
167 P.3d at 390.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 394.
38
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 4, at 34.
39
Id.
40
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 10.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 11–12 (quoting Cech, 167 P.3d at 394) (alterations in original).
33
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endangerment charge was based on “passing in no passing zones
and driving his vehicle at speeds up to 100 mph.”43
The City of Helena also points to the Court’s express decision
in Condo not to overrule Booth’s assertion that a criminal objective
cannot motivate DUI.44 Because the Court’s cases can be read as
consistent with each other, the City of Helena asserts that stare
decisis provides the “preferred course.”45
Even if the Court overturns Booth and Condo, the City of
Helena maintains the careless driving and DUI charges did not
arise from the same transaction.46A person is guilty of careless
driving if she fails to drive in a “careful and prudent manner that
does not unduly or unreasonably endanger . . . life, limb, [or]
property.”47 By contrast, DUI requires a person under the influence
of any drug “to drive or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle.”48 O’Connell committed the alleged offense of DUI as
soon as she drove or was in actual physical control of the vehicle
while under the influence.49 By contrast, officers cited O’Connell
with careless driving for colliding with several vehicles.50 The City
contends these were two separate transactions: the first transaction
occurred once O’Connell got behind the wheel under the influence
of drugs, and the second occurred when she crashed into the other
vehicles.51
C. Defendant-Appellant O’Connell’s Reply
O'Connell maintains that just because DUI does not require the
prosecutor to prove a mental state element does not mean there is
no criminal objective.52 O’Connell cites to the Court’s assertion in
State v. Glass53 that even though simple possession does not
require the State to prove what a defendant intends to do with a
dangerous drug he possesses, this does not mean the defendant has
no criminal objective in possessing the dangerous drug.54
O’Connell highlights the discrepancy between State v. Couture55
43

Id. at 12 (quoting James, 237 P.3d at 674).
Id. at 16–17; Condo, 182 P.3d at 59.
45
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting State v.
Kirkbride 185 P.3d 340, 343 (Mont. 2008)).
46
Id. at 19.
47
Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–302(1) (2017)).
48
Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–401(1)(c) (2017)).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, City of Helena v. O’Connell,
https://perma.cc/39MK-6FTC (Mont. Oct. 15, 2018) (No. DA 17-0061).
53
359 P.3d 469 (Mont. 2017).
54
Id. at 472.
55
959 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1998).
44
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and State v. Tadewaldt,56 which identify a criminal objective for
DUI, and Booth and Condo, which conversely state that strict
liability offenses such as DUI cannot be motivated by a criminal
objective.57
Additionally, O’Connell asserts stare decisis serves to protect
stability and predictability, but the Court's application of the “same
transaction” is neither predictable nor stable. Therefore, the Court
should overturn Booth and Condo.58
Finally, O’Connell maintains the singular conduct of
continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness underlies both
offenses.59 O’Connell concedes separate criminal objectives might
conceivably motivate defendants who drive under the influence for
a significant period of time before causing an accident, but asserts
both DUI and careless charges share the same criminal objective
when impairment and an accident occur contemporaneously.60
O’Connell also forcefully opposes the characterization that she
“got behind the wheel under the influence of drugs” because the
parties never stipulated to that fact.61
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court previously concluded strict liability offenses can be
motivated by a criminal objective, but more recently stated that if
there is no mental state, there is no criminal objective.62 The Court
should reconsider this assertion. If the Court upholds that strict
liability offenses cannot be motivated by a criminal objective and,
therefore, are not subject to double-jeopardy prohibitions, the
Court will effectively condone jurisdictions subsequently
prosecuting any strict liability offense regardless of the underlying

56

922 P.2d 463 (Mont. 1996).
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 52, at 5.
58
Id. at 9.
59
Id. at 7.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 13.
62
Condo, 182 P.3d at 60 (Because DUI is a strict liability offense that
does not require proof of mental state and negligent vehicular assault requires
proof of a negligent mental state the two offenses cannot be motivate by a
purpose to accomplish the same criminal objective.); Couture, 959 P.2d at 950
(“Couture’s driving without a license and without proof of insurance was
unrelated to his criminal objective of DUI—ingesting alcohol and driving a
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”); Booth, 972 P.2d at 330
(“Booth’s conduct of drinking alcohol and then driving his vehicle was ‘not
motivated by a purpose to accomplish a criminal objective.’”); Tadewaldt, 922
P.2d at 466 (95) (“Tadewaldt’s conduct in possessing the dangerous drugs was
not motivated by a purpose to accomplish the ‘criminal objective’ of DUI, nor
was it necessary or incidental to that ‘objective.’”).
57
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conduct. However, the Court already considered a nearly identical
argument in Condo and chose not to overrule Booth.63
Even if the Court overturns Booth and Condo, O’Connell
cannot prevail unless the Court agrees the careless driving charge
and the DUI charge share conduct motivated by the sole criminal
objective of continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness.
The Court will likely find O’Connell’s decision to drive while
under the influence of prescription medication was separate from
her driving decisions immediately before the accident.
O’Connell asserts a person who drives under the influence and
also causes an accident may be motivated by two different criminal
objectives, but only if a significant amount of time passes between
the two incidents.64 At its core, O’Connell’s hypothetical describes
separate conduct—that of driving under the influence and improper
driving decisions—separated by an expanse of time. O’Connell
asserts that because she suddenly became impaired immediately
before the crash, both the DUI and the careless driving were
motivated by the purpose to accomplish the same criminal
objective of continuing to drive after a sudden onset of dizziness.65
O’Connell’s assertion that a person must drive a significant
distance prior to causing an accident in order for the two offenses
to arise from different transactions frames the question of how
much time must pass. A person commits the offense of DUI as
soon as she drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle while
her ability to safely operate a vehicle has been diminished by drugs
or alcohol.66 The Court will likely view O’Connell’s decision to
drive while impaired by prescription medication as separate from
the driving decisions that caused the accident. O’Connell missed a
turn and while attempting to find a place to turn around, she
crashed into several other vehicles.67 O’Connell’s conduct
underlying the DUI was operating a vehicle while under the
influence of prescription drugs—conduct occurring prior to the
crash.
If the Court chooses to overturn Booth and Condo and find
strict liability offenses may be motivated by a purpose to
accomplish a criminal objective, the Court will have to identify the
specific conduct underlying both offenses to determine if both
were motivated by the same criminal objective. Ultimately,
O’Connell is unlikely to prevail on her double-jeopardy claim. The
more consequential question left for the Court is whether
O’Connell’s claim fails because DUI is a strict liability offense or
63

Condo, 182 P.3d at 59.
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 52, at 15.
65
Id.
66
Mont. Code Ann. § 61–8–401(1), (3)(a) (2017).
67
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
64
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because different conduct with different criminal objectives
underlies the two offenses.
V. CONCLUSION
O’Connell’s case provides the Court the opportunity to clarify
whether strict liability offenses such as DUI are motivated by a
purpose to accomplish a criminal objective, and thus may trigger
double-jeopardy protections. If the Court upholds Booth’s and
Condo’s assertion that because there is no mental state, there is no
criminal objective, then all strict liability crimes may be brought
subsequent to conviction or acquittal without violating Montana’s
double-jeopardy statute. Such a holding would significantly limit
double-jeopardy protections by removing any offense without a
mental state from the scope of the statutory protections. If the
Court determines strict liability offenses can have a criminal
objective, the Court must identify O’Connell’s conduct underlying
both charges and determine if both offenses were motivated by the
purpose to continue driving after a sudden onset of dizziness.

